Gerión

https://www.publico.pt/2017/03/26/culturaipsilon/opiniao/vamireh-chacon-e-o-futuro-politico-da-lusofonia-1766159

Es posible que hayáis escuchado la propuesta estratégica china de la "Ruta de la Seda", una serie de nuevas rutas comerciales conectando el mundo, la más conocida es el puente de tierra que atraviesa Eurasia, conectando los centros industriales chinos con las ciudades europeas. Lo que no se ve tanto es la conexión de esta ruta con Iberoamérica. Pero he visto lo siguiente en el blog que enlazo más abajo, y aquí lo traigo: una Ruta Transoceánica (Transpacífica) que desde los puertos chinos llega hasta el Perú, y de ahí con el corredor boliviano u otros, a los núcleos de Brasil. Si en el camino conectara Filipinas, mejor que mejor. Y si se enlazara Madrid con Lisboa/Sevilla/Algeciras y de ahí con el Puerto de Açu, cerraríamos el círculo. http://asiaoriental.blogs.uoc.edu/2016/07/11/estudios-asiaticos-un-factor-clave-en-la-iberoamerica-del-siglo-xxi/

A mí Fueros me gusta, conecta con la Historia. Por cierto tal y como está ahora, me encanta cómo ha quedado. Un detallito, en los nombres de los foros de los fueros, sobra algo, ahora mismo pone: «English speaking forums English speaking forum», le puse el mismo nombre al foro y al fuero, bastaría con el nombre del fuero por ejemplo.

En general, un grandísimo problema de la Hispanidad es que la geopolítica de todos nuestros países está secuestrada por la ideología. Creo que los carlistas lo advertían: los progresistas/izquierda están seducidos por Francia (hoy Europa) y los liberalconservadores/derecha, por Inglaterra (hoy EEUU). El cipayismo de Zapatero, Sánchez o Rivera en España o parte del peronismo argentino hacia Europa, y el de sectores del PP español y de la derecha latinoamericana (chilena, colombiana, brasileña) hacia EEUU/RU lo demuestra. Al final damos bandazos que nos cuestan cientos de muertos (11 M, cambio de tendencia de proamericana a proeuropea) y nos dejan sin un proyecto propio. La Hispanidad (Iberoamérica) tiene que entenderse con EEUU y la UE pero en una relación triangular equivalente, no adscribirse irremediablemente a un polo o a otro, cambiando según el gobierno. Igual que digo Francia e Inglaterra, digo EEUU y la URSS, EEUU y Rusia, EEUU y China... cualquier par de polos extranjeros tiene que tratarse igual.

Pues Bolsonaro es un nostálgico de la dictadura de los 60, y la geopolítica de esa dictadura es que Brasil era «el gendarme de EEUU en la región», aceptando de buen grado convertirse un subimperio «proxy» del norteamericano. Así que espero un eje Trump Bolsonaro, típico mecanismo angloluso de contención de lo hispano en las Américas.

Here below is the article published by Luis Zaballa on the work of Elvira Roca, researcher of the Black Legend of the Spanish Empire: "A Story to be Revived". http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/2017_ ANALISIS_11_ENG.PDF The opinions included in the following article may only be attributed to the authors and do not constitute official positions of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. LUIS ZABALLA [email protected] ANALYSIS AND PREVIEW OFFICE ‘The future belongs to those with the longest memory,’ once wrote magnificently Friedrich Nietzsche. If such is the case, it is difficult to dodge the conclusion that Spain is facing a seriously compromised future. Few intellectuals are as aware of this danger as secondary school teacher Elvira Roca, the author of the audacious essay Imperiofobia y Leyenda Negra (Imperial Phobia and the Black Legend) (Siruela, 2016), which has received excellent reviews by critics and is currently in its fourth edition. What follows is an overview of the content, followed by a brief assessment. 1. The Concept of Imperial Phobia An understanding of the imperial phobia phenomenon first requires a clarification as to the concept of an empire, given a specific meaning by Ms Roca opposite the conventional idea of colonial dominance. She defines an empire in positive terms as the ‘inclusive expansion’ of a State which replicates itself to produce new political communities for its government institutions. It is further characterised by the biological and cultural blending of its people and the egalitarian treatment they receive, which enables a type of social mobility rarely possible in pre-existing political groups. In the end, an empire is a stable political construction destined to last over time due to the positive balance on the living conditions created. As soon as an empire gives less than what it takes, says Roca, its disintegration begins. In line with this definition and introducing the necessary nuances, the author recognises the Roman, Russian, US and Spanish ones as true empires, as reflected in the book’s subtitle (Rome, Russia, the United States and the Spanish Empire). However, she avoids calling the large British, French or Dutch powers empires as, according to her conception, they are simply colonial expansions in that they established a radical hierarchical relationship between the mother country and its colonies in virtue of which the latter were merely instruments used to serve the former. Those displaced in overseas territories lack any political rights in the mother land and the natives are excluded. Censuses conducted in French and English colonies, for example, only included the European settlers whereas Spanish Imperial censuses included the indigenous and creole populations. Based on this, she defines imperial phobia as a ‘prejudice of racist aetiology’ against ‘the people who come to be the backbone of an empire’. Therefore, it’s a form of racism that doesn’t strictly derive from differences in ‘colour’ or ‘religion’ although generally ‘supported by both’. The aim is to denigrate a national ‘lineage’ with the singularity that it does not arise out of the relative weakness of said lineage but rather its strength. It amounts to a rejection of a different population yet not perceived from above, but rather from below. Another distinctive feature of imperial phobia is its social acceptability, achieved through the recruitment of an intellectual class responsible for generating defamatory stories. Thanks to the work of this intelligentsia, such prejudice gains respect and becomes practically immune to empirical refutation, thereby ensuring it withstands over time 2. The Imperial Phobia of Other Empires Rome appears as the first empire subject of defamatory literature or, at least, as the first empire capable of detecting it and manifesting its intention and procedures. Quite illustrious was the work by historian Sallust, who, based on the hostile writings of Mitridate- a sort of Viriathus of the Black Sea- identified some of the ‘clichés’ of anti-Roman imperial phobia that would be recurrently reproduced in later empires. One of these ‘clichés’ was that of ‘bad blood’ or a ‘lack of pedigree’. Unlike the Greeks, who came from the gods themselves, the Romans originated from the abduction of the Sabine Women, which reflected them as the descendants of evildoers. Another of these clichés was the ‘impiety’ by which the Romans did not respect anything divine or human in the conquered territories. They were accused of being indifferent to local religious and political traditions, replacing theocratic monarchies with an imperial administration lacking any traditional legitimacy. Another cliché is that of the ‘unconscious empire’, according to which the Roman imperial building would have resulted from an accumulation of favourable circumstances and not any intellectual or moral merit. One moderate version of this cliché acknowledged the Romans had a special ability to make war but denied them any other political or cultural virtue. Even militarily, their power only came from their cruelty and bloody nature and not their value or organisational power. As far as US imperial phobia, the author pinpoints its origin to the theory of the biological degeneration of New World species, initially formulated by naturalist Buffon and disseminated by propagandist Cornelius de Pauw in order to devalue the American hemisphere. The thesis was later reinforced by the scientific racism of authors of the likes of Arthur de Gobineau, according to whom, humans would degenerate due to the effect of racial mixing, something that would be particularly affecting the USA where the superior Anglo-Saxon and Nordic race was supposedly mixing with inferior European races and inevitably creating populations of no intelligence or beauty. Clearly, it was a variant of the cliché of bad blood which would eventually extend to the cultural arena, reflecting the USA as a desert civilisation. The defamation instrument chosen in this case were travel books in which English authors such as Frances Trollope or the very Charles Dickens saw to creating the stereotype—which is well-grounded at present— of Americans as ‘tacky, ignorant… and hyper-materialistic’ people. Finally, Russian imperial phobia unfolded in three different phases: During the first phase, which began in the 17th century, the European powers deprived of any overseas expansion planned to divide up the Russian territory among themselves in the belief that their people were not really European. And, thus arose the proverb ‘Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar’, which was used as a stimulant for the territorial distribution. The planning thereof was curiously enough handled by German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, although the project was frustrated by Russia’s resurgence at the hands of Peter the Great. In the second phase, essentially boosted by the French Enlightenment in the 18th century, there was an attempt at the intellectual patronage of France on Russia based on the new concept of ‘civilisation’ which, in practice, was understood as that which the French had, and the Russians did not. And from there, there arose a plan for political domination grounded on the new idea of the Russian danger. To give credit to the idea, one recurrent technique of imperial phobia was used – the fabrication of self-incriminatory documents. In this case, it was the false Will of Peter the Great, which was widely disseminated by Napoleon in an effort to demonstrate that—failing preventive action—Europe would become ‘Russia’s booty’. The preventive action materialised years later with the invasion of Russia and the now well-known results. During the third phase, which was activated during the 19th century upon the Crimean War, a campaign was organised by the English press through which a stereotype was created depicting Russians as aggressive and ignorant with the caricature of the fierce Russian bear as the symbol. An article on the cover of The Times eloquently began with the following sentences: ‘The policy of Russia has long been impregnated with the spirit of the deadly hostility to England’.

5. The Persistence of the Black Legend The clichés of the Black Legend remained long after Enlightenment. They were essentially republished in the 19th century through travel books in which the storytellers sought to bring out the backwards and exotic Spain they already had in mind leading to our country being considered non-European. Most of these clichés lived on throughout the 20th century and were even revived in the early 21st century to bring credibility to the high-profile financial PIGS campaign, aimed at proving Spain’s historical insolvency. Roca takes this fact as proof that the Black Legend is a current reality that offers fertile ground for those who wish to attack Spain, and which actually enables the fact that the Spanish people are right now bearing higher debt interest than other countries with a worse financial history. This leads her to wondering what the causes of the odd persistence of Spanish imperial phobia are when the motives that engendered it have been long since gone. One of the answers that pops up is that the Black Legend is a part of the foundational narrative of Protestant nations (Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, particularly) and that such narrative is useful even today for shoring up their national realities. Something similar would be happening with France, whose national narrative is based on the Enlightenment. Added to this, on the other hand, is the attitude of the Catholic Church, which is reluctant to challenge these nations, again in a field of propaganda, so as not to hinder a confessional reconciliation it has never stopped believing in. The secular helplessness of Spain —the Church’s traditional ally— can be explained by this same reason. Yet Roca highlights another essential fact, which is the active collaboration of a good number of Spanish intellectuals in accepting and disseminating imperial phobia clichés. She mentions the case of Goya, for example, who— likely very honestly— drew The Court of the Inquisition which he never could have witnessed since they had disappeared long before his time; or even Ortega, who brought the notion form Germany that disposition to science and work were linked to German blood and that German blood inherited by Spaniards came from the Visigoths, which was an already degenerated race. This would have been the explanation for the delay and decomposition of the early 20th century spineless Spain (once again, a reference to Spaniards’ bad blood). However, this collaboration by intellectuals still requires an explanation as it is not found in other countries. The author offers a psychological interpretation here, indicating the temptation of post-imperial governing classes to shrug off any responsibility for the loss of the Empire, fully denying any connection to the governing classes, which actually allowed such a loss. 6. Assessment It is no doubt a wise move to insert a study of the Black Legend in the broader phenomenon of imperial phobia as it allows the identification of different clichés and methods used in addition to an understanding of the causes behind it. The neologism “imperial phobia”, nonetheless, deserves an ambivalent opinion. On the one hand, it proves to be a functional concept that is capable of transmitting a theory in a single term and, to this end, emerges as an effective ‘meme’ which has likely contributed to the success of the book. On the other hand, it joins a present-day terminological trend of defining an ideological adversary’s positions in terms of ‘phobia’—inherently irrational—which is an obstacle to rational debate. Empires may be subject of rational criticism, there’s no doubt about that, even including the Spanish Empire of course. It is worth assuming Ms Roca would share this idea, but it would have been useful for her to have somehow done so explicitly. Another of the book’s merits lies in asking about the persistence of the Black Legend when Spain has not been a dominant power in the world for centuries. Some of the explanations proposed are suggestive, and possibly true, but it is not clear that they are fully satisfactory. It would be highly useful, to this end, for there to be continuity to the line of research undertaken by the author. Delving into the details, it is worth noting that the piece of work shares the reproduction of a story regarding the life of Bartolomé de Las Casas with other texts that are critical of the Black Legend and that is the idea that Las Casas attributed a different nature to native Americans and Africans, sacrificing the latter to save the former. The idea is often expressed in the context of the—deserved—criticism of Las Casas for his contribution to the Black Legend through his Brief Account. But, as Las Casas’s primary biographer Isacio Pérez made efforts to demonstrate, there is not a single passage in his work that lowers the nature of Africans or any other racial group. On the contrary, there are passages that solemnly and repeatedly affirm that ‘all nations are human’ and that ‘there is only one lineage of man’. The historical source of this attribution to Las Casas is seemingly found in the request sent by the King to send slaves to La Española to replace the indigenous on the island, who were disappearing— most certainly due to the diseases imported from the Old World. Pérez points out that the document making the request referred to ‘black or white’ slaves and that it was to be understood that it did not include illegally hunted slaves but rather slaves sentenced in court for having committed some type of offence such as sedition which justified this penalty of stripping them of their freedom. That being said, Las Casas would acknowledge years later that he ‘regretted’ not having been better informed of the origins of the slaves which was in all reality illegal. In any case, it does not seem fair that such error could tarnish an entire life dedicated to defending the American indigenous— as well as the Africans, as proven by Pérez— and it makes no sense at all that criticism of the Black Legend leads Spain to disowning such a figure of moral highness and historical transcendence of the likes of Las Casas. Ms Roca is one of a valuable tradition of authors who have taken it upon themselves to defend the real history of Spain. This tradition includes men of letters like Pardo Bazán and Blasco Ibáñez, Hispanists such as Philip Powell and Sverker Arnoldson, as well as public servants like Julián Juderías and—more recently— Alberto Ibáñez. When the professional backgrounds of all these authors are taken into account, their nearly total desertion of the Spanish university is surprising and inevitably leads to wondering whether Spanish professors have no interest in shedding light upon the true history of our country in opposition of the very dark propaganda. The question is particularly pressing in the case of public universities, supported with money from Spanish taxpayers. In fact, there is a great void in the centre of intellectual life in Spain, which in and of itself requires a historical, political or sociological explanation and, in any case, only emphasizes the merits of personal efforts like that of Elvira Roca, whose book is probably the most extensive and systematic study that has ever been written on the Black Legend; that fantasy which Arnoldson would define as the greatest ‘collective hallucination’ the West has ever experienced.

3. Spanish Imperial Phobia of Black Legend The author begins her study of the Black Legend highlighting the fact that neither in Spanish nor any other language is it necessary to add the qualifier ‘Spanish’ to the expression as it is already implicit in the meaning. The origins of this expression go back to two conferences by Emilia Pardo Bazán (1899) and Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (1909). If the former specifically alluded to the anti-Spanish propaganda being spread on the occasion of the 1898 Spanish-American War, the latter was already applying the concept to ‘several centuries of anti-patriotic propaganda’. However, it was the monographic book by Julián Juderías La Leyenda Negra (1914) that would consolidate this expression in the broadest of sense, examining the historical reality in-depth. Ms Roca summarises the content of the Black Legend with three basic concepts: ‘it’s opinion, it’s against Spain, and it’s unfounded’. On the other hand, it counters certain recent literature that tends to deny the current validity of the Black Legend (Henry Kamen, for example), or even deny it as historic reality (Ricardo García Cárcel), thus relegated as an illusion or narcissist obsession of the Spanish people. To refute that theory, the author presents, among other documents, an interesting 1944 report by the American Council of Education that resolutely concludes after reviewing United States textbooks from a Black Legend perspective: ‘Signs of this prejudice were found in almost all the studies… The abolition of the Black Legend… is one of our biggest problems both in education and as intellectuals as well as in politics’. In its historical development, the Black Legend would unfold in successive phases, each one of which includes new propagandistic techniques and new defamatory clichés. The first of them would be the Italian phase, originating in Aragonese and later Spanish presence through which many techniques and clichés arose which would be used in later phases. Contrary to those who interpret this later continuity as a historical consequence of the Italian phase, the author believes that it is rather a use of pre-existing ideas in accordance with the needs inherent to each phase. What most defines the Italian phase is the recruitment of intellectuals for propagandistic purposes, a task that was taken on by a variety of Renaissance humanists. One of the most significant was Florence native Paulo Jovio, who denounced the alleged oppressive presence of the Spaniards in a series of widely disseminated Stories, attributing it to the inherently defective nature of the Spanish people. The writings did not find any answers in the Empire but rather a personal response from explorer and conqueror Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada who identified certain defamatory sophistry in his book El Antijovio such as the use of the half-truth to camouflage lies in the middle of factual events or the use of tactical praise to hide the author’s slanderous motive. It was one of the first efforts to counter the anti-Spanish propaganda, yet it was never published—until 1952— which only emphasizes one of the most striking attributes of the Spanish Empire in this area: its structural defencelessness. Among the various clichés aired by Jovio and other humanists, the alleged Spanish impiety and lack of pedigree among the Spanish population stand out. Impiety was invoked each time a Pope would break his political alliance with Spain, and it can be observed in the words of Pablo IV when he called Spaniards ‘non-believers, schismatic and …the dregs of the world’. The accusation of a lack of pedigree was based on the mix of blood with the Saracens and, especially, the Jews, to the extent that Spaniards were commonly referred to as ‘pigs’. Added to these two clichés was a third, that of the alleged medieval nature of the Spaniards, which not just a few historians have assumed as a true fact in presenting the Italian Renaissance as a cultural phenomenon that arose despite the Spanish presence. Roca radically disagrees with this interpretation, pointing out that the Italian Renaissance could hardly have flourished had it not been under the ‘protective umbrella’ of the Spanish Empire which effectively defended the Italian Peninsula from the onslaught of the Ottoman Empire. The Italian phase was followed by the protestant phase with three sides: the German, the Dutch, and the English. The three would be a part of what is traditionally called the Religious Wars, although the author sees them more as Anti-Imperial Wards. To this end, she points to the fact that the Schmalkaldic League, comprised of protestant forces, was joined in 1531 by French Catholics, which would reflect the anti-imperial nature of the enterprise. The German side would originate in the crisis of the Germanic feudal regime, which would lead to the serious impoverishment of the peasantry and even the aristocracy. As a way out, the idea was promoted that Catholicism was a foreign political power (Italian, Spanish, etc.) that justified the confiscation of their property. Support was requested of the emperor Charles who obviously denied such request, inevitably leading to the conflagration. An ideological reconfiguration of the economic problem required the concurrence of the intellectuals, particularly Martin Luther, who directed his tirades against the Pope, calling him the ‘Anti-Christ’, and against Spain for holding up the Empire. He even once wrote that ‘Spaniards are obviously beasts’. Roca goes to great effort to prove that the result of this political operation was a real Germanic civil war between the Germans on both sides irrespective of how it has been presented as a religious war and national emancipation. One significant aspect of German imperial phobia is the decisive exploitation of the printing press as a propagandistic weapon of war to the point of being able to affirm that the combination of the printing press and the pre-existing defamatory techniques in all reality amount to the origin of modern propaganda. The printing press was further used to reproduce images on a massive scale for the first time ever, which made it possible to reach the immense illiterate population. The social impact and mobilising power incriminatory and deliberately scabrous images proved to have facilitated the discovery that the power of propaganda lies in its capacity to arouse emotions among the public, more than transmitting any argument. The English side of protestant imperial phobia would originate in the reign of Henry VIII, especially due to the constitution of the Church of England, and it would reach its apogee with the English-Spanish War (1585-1604), which opposed Elizabeth I and Philip II. However, the rivalry would continue, as reflected by the statement made decades later by Oliver Cromwell before the Parliament: ‘Our true enemy is the Spanish. Them. They’re the inherent enemy’. Roca defines the boundaries of this rivalry by pointing out that England was the leader of the Protestant world and Spain, the leader of the Catholic world, which explains how it has persisted over time even into our days. The main imperial phobia cliché was, in any case, that of Spanish impiety. Cromwell concluded his parliamentary diatribe against the Spanish people by invoking ‘that animosity against all things godly’. Hence, a new cliché arose, that of the alleged Spanish incompetence and ineptitude. The cliché was especially applied to the failed ‘Invincible Armada’, although the propaganda of self-exaltation eventually won out over that of defamation—with which it is incompatible in this arena. A good amount of English historiography has glossed this battle as a turning point at which England took the reins from Spain in the dominance of the seas, something still reflected in films periodically dedicated to Elizabeth I. Roca proves how nobody at the time interpreted this battle in those terms and how, in fact, it was part of a lengthy war that concluded with the 1604 Treaty of London, which substantially favoured Spain’s interests. She takes advantage of this to point out how the English Armada was beat by the Spanish Armada several times (Veracruz 1568, Contra-Armada 1589, Cartagena de Indias 1740, Argentina 1804 and 1806), although this is unknown to the general public because, unlike the failure of the Invincible Armada, it does not appear in textbooks or cinema. The author refers to this concealment of one’s own losses as a deletion technique commonly used in countries with propagandistic traditions, which has generally gone unnoticed in countries like Spain, which have even gone so far as coming to terms with this selective historiography. The Dutch side developed in the context of the War of Flanders (1568-1648), known outside Spain as the Dutch Revolt. Even the name evokes a fight for national emancipation against a foreign power which would, of course, be Spain. Such is suggested by the very national anthem of the Netherlands, which includes the words allegedly written by William of Orange: ‘My spirit is tormented, noble and loyal people, seeing how the cruel Spanish are affronting you’. The author maintains that the War of Flanders was also a civil war, which began with an anti-Imperial and anti-ecclesiastical uprising of the upper ranks of the Dutch nobility which split the population into two opposing factions. Thus, the Duke of Alba’s army had 54,300 soldiers in 1573 even though only 7,900 were SpaGonzalo Jiménez de Quesada niards when the number of Flemish soldiers only totalled 30,000. On the other hand, the army of Orange supporters always included a strong number of German mercenaries and French Huguenots, all of which leads the author to the astonishing conclusion that ‘there were more Dutch people fighting on the royal side than the Orange side’. The anti-Spanish propaganda from the Orange side was due to a specific political demand to delegitimise an emperor who had taken power of Flanders through the habitual hereditary means and without contest. ‘Philip II was as much the King of Castile as he was the King of the Netherlands’, points out the author, ‘meaning it was difficult to convince public opinion’ of his illegitimacy. This strategy precisely owed to the completely unfounded accusation that Philip II had assassinated his son Charles, a story that would perpetuate in collective European imagination through the novels of Saint-Real (1673) and Schiller (1787) as well as the famous Verdi opera (1876). The success of this black propaganda, along with the systematic use of various techniques to manipulate public opinion available at the time (printing press, images, etc.) has given William of Orange the title of the father of modern propaganda. Roca even defines him as ‘one of the creators of the modern world’ for this very reason. Finally, the enlightened phase of anti-Spanish imperial phobia largely appears as a reworking of the Italian phase where the intellectual enlightened elite reproduces the clichés produced by its ‘humanist’ predecessor. For example, this is the case of the accusation of Spanish backwardness and medievalism, although no longer coupled with the charge of impiety. On the contrary, the problem with Spain for the enlightened was precisely its excessive religious devotion and submission to ecclesiastic instruction. That was when the notion arose that Spain’s political and cultural decline in the 18th century was ultimately due to the suffocation of intellectual freedom caused by the Inquisition through its List of Prohibited Books. Roca tries to dismantle this theory, indicating that the Inquisition only conditioned the publication of potentially heretic religious books and that the list did not affect the dissemination of ideas in literary, philosophical or scientific fields, meaning it hardly could have had the devastating impact it is attributed in these areas. She further warns that contemporary European countries, and particularly the Protestant ones, had censorship systems that were as restrictive as the Spanish ones or even more so. Even enlightened France maintained a double state and ecclesiastical censorship system which banned a large number of works freely published in Spain. After this, the author reflects upon the deletion technique, which was originally applied in Protestant propaganda, and later developed through enlightened propaganda. For example, she criticises the fact that today’s textbooks associate the Enlightenment with the greatest of human ideals all while hiding the justification of the slave trade by its main intellectual representatives, which turned the 18th century into the great century of slavery. Montesquieu, for example, defended the ‘natural servitude of the Indians’, and attributed Spain’s decline to the massive miscegenation with American races, furthering the old cliché of the Spanish bad blood. It is important to underline that the propagandistic deletion technique is not only used to hide one’s own demerits, but also the demerits of others. Particularly, Roca points out that a large amount of the great intellectual contributions attributed to the Enlightenment originated in the Renaissance (and quite particularly in Spanish scholasticism); however, the authors did not have the dignity to acknowledge their sources meaning their ideas spread as ahistorical apparitions (‘like wildfire’, says Roca) without any intellectual background or historical context. Another widespread cliché arose during the Enlightenment consisting of assigning the relative delay in Spain and even its lack of ‘civilisation’ to the expulsion of the Jews decreed in 1492, something that would have deprived the country of a particularly dynamic population economically and intellectually speaking. Without forgetting to lament the human price of the expulsion, Roca rejects this theory completely, indicating that the centuries that followed actually saw the rise and splendour of Spain in all areas. 4. The Inquisition and Conquest The cliché of the Inquisition as an agent of terror in Spanish society, which was responsible for mass torture and death, is challenged by the author with a meticulous review of 44,000 inquisitional records by Gustav Henningsen and Jaime Contreras, which revealed that 1,346 of the accused had been sentenced to die between 1540 and 1700 (which would amount to an average of 9 executions a year). This number also includes crimes such as rape, child abuse, currency falsification and weapons smuggling, generally pursued by national courts. As a contrast in terms of scale, she cites the work of British historian James Stephen, who proved that England had executed 264,000 people in three centuries (some 900 a year). The studies further demonstrate that, far from being dominated by torture, the inquisitional procedure was the most justly of that era. Roca gives an account of studies revealing how less than 2% of the inquisitional processes included some form of torture and even how this marginal practice was subject to constant review and restriction to the point that the Inquisition was, by her estimates, ‘the first court in the world that prohibited torture, one hundred years before this ban became widespread’. As concerns the persecution of witchery, Roca refers to the assembly of theologists held in Granada in 1526, which instilled scepticism within the Spanish church regarding this phenomenon. It drastically restricted the definition of prosecutable cases, which in any case had to cease upon the repentance of the accused. The contrasting treatment of witchery in other European countries, particularly the Protestant ones, is overwhelming. Henningsen calculates that some 50,000 witches were burnt (half of them in Germany, 4,000 in Switzerland, 4,000 in France and 1,500 in England) with exactly 27 attributed to the Inquisition. Finally, the author examines the religious persecution in the Protestant world as Juderías did a century before. The principle of cuius region, eius religio, according to which subjects had to adopt the faith of their prince, set off mass religious persecution in all directions and turning the principle of ‘freedom of conscience’ into a sarcastic joke. Roca also emphasizes how most of the religious wars and persecution cases opposed different Protestant factions against each other even to the point of stating that ‘they caused more deaths than the battles against the Catholics’ As concerns the Black Legend of the conquest of America, she studies the case of A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, pointing out that Bartolomé de Las Casas could not have witnessed the massacres he described—something he later admitted himself— yet they were massively disseminated through the printing presses in Flanders, England and Germany, illustrated with the horrendous engravings by Theodor de Bry. The propagandistic technique of using a (false) witness of incriminatory events was, therefore, combined with the exploitation of the printing press and the exacerbation of emotions through graphic images. Roca contrasts the destiny of the American indigenous under the Spanish Empire with their destiny under the British and American power. She emphasizes the recognition of the natural equality of the indigenous people as early as the era of the Catholic Monarchs, which was transferred to all sorts of laws dedicated to preserving their population and preventing their exploitation in addition to the miscegenation practices fostered by imperial authorities. Of the factors that could explain the absence of a similar policy in the North, she alludes to the inexistence of a ‘resisting clergy’ who were listened to by those governing. She also approaches the cliché still maintained in today’s publications, that the current delay in Latin America with respect to North America is due to a culture of entrepreneurism and science that supposedly existed in British but not Spanish power. Roca criticises this idea, underlining that Mexico City was notoriously larger, more dynamic and richer than Washington at the time of the American independence and that the salaries of the indigenous were higher than in the West. The contrast is coherent with the quite higher number of printing presses, universities, scientific publications and hospitals documented in the Spanish Empire.

Me gusta mucho cómo han quedado los accesos a los foros de los Fueros, además es muy personalizado, es decir cada usuario verá un sistema de "foros forales" diferente, en función de dónde esté metido. PD: Os comento, en cuanto pueda tengo intención de abrir un Fuero/Comunidad en inglés, otro en portugués, y traducir los textos más relevantes que rescate del foro.

Es curioso que estas áreas estratégicas que identificaron recuerden a los virreinatos, cuando toda América era Una: 1. México+EEUU+Caribe = Virreinato de Nueva España 2. Antemural interoceánico = Virreinato de Nueva Granada 3. Cono sur = Virreinato del Río de la Plata 4. Cornisa andina = Virreinato del Perú 5. Dilatación lusófona = Virreinato de Portugal (incluía Brasil) (Y como raíz espiritual: 6. Foco español = Castilla y Aragón ) Esta caracterización "pentagonal" de las Américas nos ofrece en bandeja las macrounidades de integración subregional necesarias. No había que ir muy lejos, sólo rascar en la historia. En la realidad, la fragmentación americana es tan fuerte que tenemos potentes divisorias ideológicas en cada una de estas unidades subregionales: Cuba contra EEUU, Venezuela contra Colombia, Bolivia contra Perú, Argentina contra Chile.

El IEEE y los Cuadernos de Estrategia. Iré comentando alguno. De momento dejo el siguiente, que tiene ya unos cuantos años (es del 2002): http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/cuadernos/CE_118_Iberoamerica.pdf Interesante dejar aquí las 6 áreas estratégicas en las que dividen el "conjunto hispánico": De donde se obtienen estas líneas de interés prioritario:

De la relación entre biogeografía y geopolítica se pueden sacar dos ideas más. -La primera es un principio de "inevitabilidad paleártica" que consiste en una fortísima tendencia de España (la Península) a vincularse con Europa y reconstituirse en ella. El influjo histórico de las dinastías continentales, austríacas y francesas, y la entrada de España en la UE parece confirmar esta tesis. No es más que el famoso encuadre de España como charnela entre Europa y América, pero visto desde la biogeografía. Muy lejos de América, muy cerca de Europa. -La segunda es el principio de "inevitabilidad neártica" que es lo mismo pero con México y EEUU. La situación de México con medio país en el Reino Neártico, ocupado principalmente por EEUU, le condena a entenderse con ellos. La situación de sometimiento de México bajo la hegemonía norteamericana y los tratados USMCA-NAFTA lo demuestran. Las dos uniones, la Unión Norteamericana (de facto) y la Unión Europea, son los principales agentes que producen un desgaje del bloque iberoamericano por la extirpación de México y España del proyecto, cada uno hacia un lado. Tras esta doble extirpación (o secuestro), tenemos que irnos a la cadena de países de Centroamérica (que actúan como "Estados-tapón") y finalmente Colombia para encontrar una "frontera geopolítica efectiva" entre el Reino Neártico y el Reino Neotropical (quizá de ahí el interés norteamericano en llenar de bases Colombia y meterla, como ha ocurrido, como Global Partner de la OTAN y como miembro de la OECD), reducido en la práctica a Brasil y poco más; como mucho, el Mercosur. México, España y Colombia se reafirman así como países claves en cualquier proyecto hispanista: dos territorios secuestrados y un territorio frontera. Es difícil escapar de este juego de poderes, ya que el "campo gravitatorio" de la UE y de EEUU es muy poderoso, e igual que Júpiter con el Cinturón de Asteroides, la existencia de ambas uniones asegura la fragmentación de la Hispanidad. El "manual" obliga a destruir a España y a México si se atisba cualquier movimiento de "escapada" de ambos de los Reinos Neártico y Paleártico, de ahí la balcanización incipiente de España y la que tienen también preparada en México. La respuesta debe ser un especial mimo de la unidad de España y de México, y una diplomacia inteligente para "calmar" el influjo de EEUU y la UE.

Se entiende perfectamente, y está genial. Piensa que desconozco la flexibilidad de la arquitectura de la web, lo que a mí me parece sencillo puede ser imposible y viceversa.

Relaciones entre biogeografía y geopolítica No sé si conocéis el campo de la biogeografía. Básicamente estudia la distribución espacial de los seres vivos sobre el planeta: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biogeografía Existe un concepto dentro de este campo que es el de "Reino Biogeográfico". Es la máxima división biogeográfica posible: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biogeographic_realm En cada Reino suele haber una comunidad de plantas y animales similares; las especies suelen distribuirse siguiendo estos patrones y deteniéndose en las divisorias. Es lo que explica que haya osos pardos en Rusia y Rumanía pero no en África, tigres en la India pero no en Europa, y lo mismo para todas las especies de plantas y animales.Los Reinos Biogeográficos más aceptados son los siguientes: Neártico, Paleártico, Oriental, Neotropical, Afrotropical, y Australiano. Un estudio más reciente analizando el patrón territorial de cientos de especies añade unos cuantos más: dos grandes, el Sahariano-Árabe y el Sino-Japonés, y otros dos más pequeños: el Malgache y el Oceánico. La cosa no pasaría de aquí si no fuera por que, en geopolítica, las divisorias entre civilizaciones según muchos autores acaban pasando por los mismos sitios que las biogeográficas. Traigo la propuesta de Huntington, y la mía propia siguiendo las "Plataformas Continentales" de Armesilla pero añadiendo alguna más: De hecho, se podría hacer el siguiente mapeo entre reinos biogeográficos y civilizaciones humanas. Creo que esto es completamente original, no lo he visto por ningún sitio. En exclusiva para Corazón Español: Reino Neártico = Plataforma angloamericana Reino Neotropical = Plataforma iberoamericana Reino Afrotropical = Plataforma africana Reino Sahariano-Árabe = Plataforma islámica Reino Paleártico = Plataformas europea y eurasiática Reino Sinojaponés = Plataforma oriental Reino Oriental = Plataformas india e indopacífica Reino Australiano = también de la Plataforma angloamericana Esto no tendría que extrañarnos. La geopolítica siempre ha tenido un puntito determinista geográfico desde sus inicios. La cosa es que las especies animales siguen cursos naturales para extenderse: climas similares y conocidos, llanos, ríos, costas. Los reinos e imperios humanos siguen también estos cursos. Los imperios se encuentran con barreras geográficas como el Sáhara o el Océano; los animales también. Los imperios y reinos son los que históricamente configuran los espacios postimperiales, y de éstos, las civilizaciones. Es cierto que imperios como el español trascendieron estas barreras como en el cruce del Atlántico y el Pacífico, y de ahí su grandeza. Pero no menos cierto es que en los procesos de decadencia imperial aparecen insistentemente patrones de reajuste geométrico debido a esas barreras geográficas, que parecen querer imponerse. A los hispanos, entendiendo éstos como la Comunidad Iberoamericana, que tiene unos pocos países en la Península, pero con el grueso en la América al sur del Bravo, parece que "nos ha tocado", por esta suerte de imposición geográfica, seguir los pasos del Reino Neotropical. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neotrópico Estados Unidos arremetió contra el Virreinato de Nueva España y despedazó la proyección neártica de México. A la vez, el Brasil portugués, ha seguido un curso similar al de las repúblicas hispanoamericanas por lo que parece que la geografía quiere hermanarles en su destino. En Europa (el Reino Paleártico), lo hispano fue hegemónico un tiempo, pero no alcanzó el carácter de civilización impregnante (que sí tuvo en América) como sí lo hizo Roma. ¿Podemos aprender algo de todo esto? Por un lado, no hay que quedarse aquí, ya que caeríamos en una suerte de determinismo geográfico como el practicado por los ilustrados franceses (que proponían, absurdamente, que todo lo americano es degenerado, todo lo europeo es sublime) o muchos otros después. Por otro, no está de más sacar algunas ideas. Los Reinos Biogeográficos son una suerte de "poso" y resultado de la lucha entre "imperios animales" durante millones de años. Lo primero, a valorar positivamente, es la mera existencia de este patrón. Es decir, hemos conseguido trazar un patrón neotropical=iberoamericano. Quizás nos pondríamos más nerviosos si los patrones biogeográficos no indicaran la existencia misma de "algo" con cierta unidad en tierras centro y suramericanas. Imperios como el francés en África no seguían patrones biogeográficos y podemos preguntarnos si su caída tan rápida está relacionada de alguna forma. Lo segundo es que el Neotrópico es una región bastante aislada del mundo. Su situación en uno de los confines de la Tierra (el otro Reino que también está en los confines es el australiano) asegura una cierta existencia pacífica. Muchas especies suramericanas, algunas descendientes de linajes que trazan su historia hasta el antiguo continente de Gondwana, son raras, endémicas. Suramérica es una suerte de gran Australia a efectos biológicos, pero también geopolíticos. Autores como Florentino Díaz Loza resaltan este aislamiento y afirman que lo más seguro es que en territorio iberoamericano no se desarrollarán las grandes guerras que cambian o cambiarán el mundo. Éstas lo harán en la gran masa afroeurasiática. La historia de los imperios humanos parece confirmarlo. También las especies animales sufren una presión más fuerte en Afroeurasia. Esto nos permitiría justificar una geopolítica aislacionista y no intervencionista. No sacaremos gran cosa de las guerras de Afroeurasia. Pero tampoco deberíamos sufrir sus consecuencias, y deberíamos tener la suficiente independencia para no involucrarnos en ellas (principio que no se siguió en la Guerra Fría). Esta, creo, sería la parte buena. Lo tercero es que esta situación de aislamiento tiene su parte mala, y es que periódicamente aparecen influjos de los otros Reinos (Plataformas) que a veces son devastadores. En la historia animal tenemos el "Gran Intercambio Americano". https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gran_intercambio_americano Se resume en que cuando se formó el istmo de Panamá, las poblaciones del Reino Neártico arrasaron a las del Reino Neotropical; también hubo algunas especies neotropicales que marcharon al Norte y triunfaron, pero muchas menos. Algunos han querido ver en la Conquista de América por parte de España, o en el sometimiento por parte de EEUU a Latinoamérica, un proceso parecido. Lo que creo que podemos sacar en claro es que la situación de aislamiento tiene un riesgo de "quedarse atrás" en las luchas por la hegemonía mundial frente a los imperios de otras Plataformas o Reinos, más conectados entre sí. Por lo que es necesaria una exigencia continua de actualización en todos los campos (ciencia, técnica, industria, ejército), que es posible que no llegue de forma natural. Hay más ideas que se pueden sacar de todo esto, pero prefiero dejarlo aquí.

Perdona, no había leído la condición del número de caracteres. De todas formas si tengo un tiempo puedo tantear varios diseños de tipografía para el estilizado del título y los voy subiendo a ver qué os parecen. Otra cosa. Me vas a llamar pesado pero tengo otra petición. He visto que has puesto las comunidades a nivel de los foros, está genial. ¿Se podría poner el foro específico de "Corazón Mexicano" (y los que vengan: Hispanic Heart, Spanisches Herz, etc) al mismo nivel que el resto (por ejemplo, que Memoria de las Españas)? Tal y como está ahora, hay que hacer un total de 3 clics para acceder al foro mexicano, está un poco escondido. Me preocupa la visibilidad. Si se consigue poner al mismo nivel, lo suyo sería que se viera también el número de publicaciones. Me explico con una imagen. Ya me dices. Si se consigue esto, podemos también usarlo para ir archivando temas antiguos en sus diferentes temáticas con comunidades temáticas, sin que se queden escondidos.

Inventario de identidades geopolíticas para la Hispanidad/Iberoamérica No está de más inventariar los esquemas de identidad que pueden ser útiles para los relatos geopolíticos. Vamos allá, espero no dejarme ninguno: 1. Lo hispánico. La definición político-histórica que podemos dar es lo proveniente de las naciones que provienen, o declaran su independencia, de los imperios y reinos que nacen en Hispania, el español (que incluyó un tiempo al siguiente), el portugués, y alguno dirá también que el aragonés y el navarro. Es decir: las naciones de la Península Ibérica, de la América iberohablante, Filipinas, del Asia y África lusófonas, Guinea y el Sáhara, y lo originario de todas ellas, así como las personas y cultura con esta ascendencia en los Estados Unidos, Francia, Luxemburgo y otros territorios. 2. Lo ibérico. Es una sustitución "políticamente correcta" de lo "hispánico" debido al rechazo del primer término por parte del nacionalismo portugués, que propone que lo luso no es hispánico. En este esquema, la suma de lo hispánico y lo luso daría lugar a lo ibérico. En el esquema anterior, lo castellano y lo luso daría lugar a lo hispánico. Realmente son sinónimos y pertenecen a dos etimologías griega y romana de lo mismo. A día de hoy se usa sólo para designar a lo peninsular. 3. Lo iberoamericano. Segundo ajuste y concesión del término hispánico, pero en este caso debido al rechazo por parte de las naciones americanas. En este punto está radicada la diplomacia oficial. Aquí ya aparece el esquema de lo americano separado de lo ibérico, siendo lo iberoamericano una suma de ambos conjuntos (en la mejor de las interpretaciones) o en la interpretación más común, solamente lo que proviene de la América iberohablante. Acaba correspondiendo, en este reajuste amerocéntrico, a una interpretación birregional exclusiva de lo hispánico: la Península junto a la América iberohablante, dejando fuera al África y al Asia de origen hispano. Geopolitólogos recientes acuñan lo iberófono o lo panibérico para recuperar a estos olvidados de otros continentes. 4. Lo latinoamericano. Imposición de la diplomacia francesa para vincular la América al sur del Bravo con la Europa latina con centro en Francia. Por la eurofilia y francofilia de las élites americanas del pasado, junto con el uso extenso y apropiación de "lo americano" por los EEUU, que malograba el uso de este término para el resto de naciones del Continente, el término se extiende como la pólvora y a día de hoy es el esquema de identidad predominante en la América al sur del Bravo. Con este proceso de apropiación de "americano" por parte de EEUU se llega a perder la segunda raíz y se queda en lo latino, de lo más usado en Internet y se confunde con el otro "latino" que se comenta después. 5. Lo latinoamericano-caribeño. Se ve mucho últimamente, también con el acrónimo LAC y se puede considerar un pequeño logro de la diplomacia latinoamericana, tras un ejercicio de desidia por parte de las potencias anglo y francófonas. Excluye a la Península, incluye al Caribe no iberohablante. 6. Lo americano. Fue una evolución de lo indiano (el viejo nombre del imperio español era el de Reino de las Españas y las Indias, siendo las Indias tanto América como Asia: una traducción geográfica moderna sería Reino de la Península, la América y el Asia) perdiendo a Filipinas y metiendo el nombre del impostor italiano por el camino. Durante un tiempo fue el esquema de identidad principal de los españoles del otro lado del mar (Bolívar: La Patria es América), pero después, fue adoptado por EEUU dejando al resto sin nada y en blanco. Reversiones de este concepto con origen en EEUU son lo panamericano o lo hemisférico. La Hispanidad mantiene el nombre de lo americano para el conjunto de la Alaska a la Patagonia, con un singular, la América. También tenemos "las Américas", "el Hemisferio" como vocablos de origen estadounidense (el segundo con cierta tradición hispana) para referirse a todo el continente. Cualquiera de estos esquemas proporciona un relato para la dialéctica interamericana, entre Iberoamérica y los Estados Unidos, y el adjetivo para quien la practique, americanista. 7. Lo latino. El uso clásico de lo latino se reserva a las naciones que provienen de los imperios y reinos de las regiones latinoparlantes del Imperio romano, España, Portugal, Francia, Italia, Rumanía y otros. Sirve para proporcionar un relato a la llamada "Latinidad", principalemente entre Iberoamérica, la Europa latina y el África francófona y lusófona, y latinista quien lo practique. Tenemos también por ahí lo eurolatinoamericano en algunas cumbres, vendría a ser lo que tiene que ver con Europa al completo (no sólo la Europa latina) junto a Latinoamérica. 8. Lo mediterráneo. En este caso nos vamos a identidades hidrográficas. La invocación de lo mediterráneo suele servir para articular un eje greco-romano-hispánico para articular el sur de Europa o incluso greco-romano-arábigo-hispánico incluyendo al Islam en las estrategias geopolíticas de aproximación a lo musulmán y lo árabe. 9. Lo atlántico es otro esquema de identidad hidrográfica menos practicada por los hispanos ya que está tomado por el mundo anglosajón, pero sí tenemos lo sudatlántico, practicado por brasileños en su despliegue hacia Angola y África. 10. Lo pacífico, este sí, lo vemos ejercido por la Alianza del Pacífico y con una larga tradición histórica, puede funcionar en las relaciones con Asia. 11. Lo sureño. La idea del Sur, o Mediodía aparece de muchas formas, desde la despectiva en la historiografía protestante referidas a lo sureuropeo (los demonios del Mediodía) hasta la reivindicación de épocas recientes y con carácter global ("el Sur global"), también la América del Sur con lo suramericano, el Meridión del "meridionalismo" de los brasileños con intenciones de articular el Tercer Mundo, o "el Hemisferio sur" al completo con liderazgo latinoamericano. Invocada por Elvira Roca. 12. Lo romano. Aquí nos vamos a todas las naciones que tienen su origen en Roma y que reivindican ese origen, en este sentido es equivalente a lo europeo, o mejor aún lo occidental incluyendo a las Américas y otras naciones occidentalizadas. A día de hoy esta idea del "Occidente" aparece representada casi siempre dividida en un Norte y un Sur de Occidente, estando en estos momentos el Sur (tanto de Europa como de América) sometido al Norte, pero los dos ambicionan su liderazgo. Invocada por aquellos que retrotraen la Hispanidad a la herencia de Roma. 13. Lo católico. En su distribución geográfica se superpone a lo hispánico, lo latino, lo sureño y lo occidental (entre otros) en diferentes grados, pero aparecen arcos de proyección nuevos dada su vocación universal: Polonia, Hungría, Canadá, África central... 14. Lo cristiano. "La Cristiandad" era el esquema de identidad medieval y practicado por los imperios y reinos durante siglos, hasta la Res Publica Christiana de Carlos V o unidad de cristianos de todo el mundo. De aquí deriva también la Hispanidad. 15. Lo universal. En nuestra tradición, vemos este concepto elaborado por la Escuela de Salamanca para trascender la república cristiana y ampliarse a las civilizaciones de "Todo el Orbe": Res Publica Totius Orbis.

Propongo "El latido de la Hispanidad", sin más, y con H mayúscula.

Sobre el icono de "Corazón Hispano", mi opinión es que se puede usar el mismo timón+barco que tenemos en Corazón español, que está muy bien, soy un enamorado de ese icono, simplemente poner CORAZÓN HISPANO a la derecha.

De acuerdo con don Fernandito en todo. Yo lo que propongo es que, de momento, tengamos 2 o 3 comunidades hispanas, la de Corazón Mexicano, Corazón Puertorriqueño, y he visto que ya hay contenido para el Spanisches Herz, o yo podría crear contenido para un Hispanic American Heart a través de algunas traducciones. Como a día de hoy no tenemos usuarios activos para rellenar tantas comunidades, lo que propongo es que de momento funcionen como depósito de temas antiguos, una especie de Archivo (por ejemplo para los hilos nombrados), además de crear un par de hilos de seguimiento de diferentes temas (reunificacionistas de Puerto Rico, seguimiento conferencias de Jalife, etc). Pero necesito/pido un par de cosas, a ver si se puede: -De momento cada comunidad no da para tener 3 subforos (he visto que en Corazón Mexicano hay 3 subforos). Debería, de momento tener un solo foro y ya se verá en el futuro. -Las 2 o 3 comunidades que creemos, sobre todo ahora que son pocas y estratégicas, deberían ser bien visibles en el índice general de foros, quizá debajo de "Memoria de las españas", con el nombre bien visible de "Corazón Puertorriqueño", "Corazón Mexicano", etc. cada una en una línea. Ya me decís.

La geometría económica de la Unión Europea y del mundo (de éste, también poblacional). De http://www.viewsoftheworld.net/

Lo he creado, con un nombre, "Corazón Mexicano", una imagen del escudo de México que a lo mejor ha descuadrado algo, una descripción resumida pero sin descripción general (el campo de más abajo). Poco más.

Por cierto, si alguien os pregunta, este es el audio que yo mandaría escuchar a todos los que quieren acercarse al tema de una forma medianamente seria. 3 horas de una entrevista que le hicieron en Histocast, que pasan voladas y donde Elvira hace una exposición extensa de todos sus puntos fuertes: el mecanismo de imperiofobia como articulación de la envidia y odio al imperio, la creación de la Leyenda negra antiespañola por los italianos, la radicalización orangista e inglesa, las "pelucas" francesas, la asunción de la leyenda negra por parte de los hispanos y caída del imperio, la necesidad de mantenerla viva hoy (por parte de nuestros enemigos) y la estupidez de copiar ese discurso.

Voy a citar este post de Hispanorromano del hilo de bibliografía sobre un libro de geopolítica de mediados del siglo XX para comentarlo: El autor (CAVANNA EGUILUZ) estructura su libro en una primera parte de tipo genérica, sobre el hecho de la Nación, su unidad, geometría, frontera, literal, y población; haciendo una mención al castellano. En la segunda parte ya despliega sus propuestas de proyección y a lo que más espacio dedica es: 1. Iberismo. 2. Africanismo (Marruecos). 3. Iberoamericanismo. 4. Universalismo y catolicidad. Lo términos nos recuerdan al cuadro-inventario de "esquemas de identidad" que he expuesto hace pocos posts, y también nos devuelve al esquema geopolítico trino de Vázquez de Mella, a saber: 1. Unidad ibérica. 2. Control del Estrecho. 3. Confederación con América. Es decir, los escenarios están más que planteados y son repasados una y otra vez por diferentes autores.

Ya que tenemos varios hilos sobre López Obrador, Pérez Viejo, Jalife... podríamos moverlos a la Comunidad que he creado de "Corazón Mexicano" (que no sé si he hecho bien porque da un error, mi intención es que sea pública). También de momento tenemos material para una que sea "Corazón Puertorriqueño" con las propuestas de unificación y alguna otra. Así en vez de perderse en el final de los foros, los mantenemos como temas de seguimiento por territorio.

Un vídeo que creo que no está puesto. De este vídeo he tomado bastantes apuntes de su visión geopolítica, que puse en el otro hilo.